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**OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**

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**RECORDED** **100A-126-182/62** The Zulu-West region of the U.S. Virgin Islands is part of the West Indies. It is not fed by rivers, but by **12 February 1962** the year of the record, about 1000 cubic feet per second per year.

**MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL L. J. LEWIS FORCE CALL UP OF THE NEW GUARDEES OVER THE DRAFT POSITION OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT**

SUBJECT: Estimate of European NATO Build-up Over the Next Year.  
INFO FOR: A short term build-up toward an anticipated crisis over Berlin, as well as  
the reference is made to your 10 February telephone request for an informal  
NATO Affairs (European Region, OASD/ISA) summary (one or two pages)  
of the above subject, covering the following: the effect of providing  
a higher plateau of forces. That is, what measures can we take  
to how have our European NATO Allies responded to the Berlin  
crisis. Consequently, the former paragraph can be left blank.  
LEVEL: C.I. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. What would be the effect on force build-up by our European NATO Allies during the next year if, during that period of time, thereby were no change in the present state of affairs, i.e., no worsening or no relaxation of the Berlin crisis; no division of Germany and organization of the West, eleventh and twelfth with short-term political objectives such as administrative reorganization on the basis of b. above, how would NATO one year from now stand with respect to the Soviet Bloc, i.e., better off, worse off, or passed the same? (Answer by 1 April 1961), the high command levels in the U.S. should be maintained. This process is to be carried out in concert with the U.S. for

24. The summary you requested is attached as an enclosure. In this connection, you may wish to contact Mr. Broome Smith in regard to information on Soviet Bloc and NATO build-up furnished him by memoranda dated 29 December 1961 and 4 January 1962.

**Dated 29 December 1961 and 14 January 1962.** In view of the Berlin crisis by returning the division to the continent, and in view of the fact that if the Algerian problem is settled in the coming year, the French will probably return the three divisions to the continent, and we talked about returning full three divisions. The SIGNED commandant French divisions on the continent, reorganized and in part reinforced, would strengthen the land force strength of M. Miner forces.

Colonel, USA

d. Mr. Savic, does very little to **Deputy Director** filling during the Fall of 1951, the British control by **European Region** in their position under command of the British as well as they will meet.

1 Enclosure.; as a slight note about the  
a/s -

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...and the Rep. Board, the  
Chairman of the Judicial Committee,  
and the permanent members, one from each  
of the four main committees.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DDC DIR 5200.10

ESTIMATE OF EUROPEAN NATO BUILD-UP  
OVER THE NEXT YEAR

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1. Assumption: That the East-West crisis especially as it relates to Berlin and Central Europe is not fed by new incidents and pressures on the part of the Soviets or East Germans for a period of one year.
2. Question: How have our European NATO Allies responded to the Berlin crisis? What would be the effect on the force build-up of the NATO countries over the next year under the assumption outlined in paragraph 1 above?

a. General: Although there was considerable pressure in NATO for a short term build-up toward an anticipated crisis over Berlin, many of the actions taken under the stimulus of Secretary Ruak's presentation before the EAC on 8 August 1961 and the SACEUR "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" were actually long term and should have the effect of providing a higher plateau of forces. That is, some of the most dramatic actions taken were accelerations of actions that were about to be taken in any event. Consequently, the forces generated should not be affected by a leveling off of pressures over Berlin.

b. Germany: The Berlin crisis set in motion a series of actions by the FRO which should maintain momentum for at least one year. The Germans were able to commit their ninth division to SACEUR and organize the tenth, eleventh and twelfth with short term personnel actions such as administratively retaining personnel on active duty. If legal action is completed on raising the term of conscription from 18 to 18 months (now estimated to be passed by Bundestag by 1 April 1962), the higher force levels in the FRO should be maintained. This program is supported by agreement with the U.S. for common item logistics support. There is good reason to believe the Germans will maintain and improve their new force level.

c. France: The French took credit for responding to the Berlin crisis by returning two divisions to the continent from Algeria in the Fall of 1961. If the Algerian problem is settled in the coming year, the French will probably return two more divisions to the continent and have talked about returning full three divisions. Two to three additional French divisions on the continent, reorganized and in position to reinforce SACEUR, would strengthen the land force strength of SACEUR's forces.

d. UK: Having done very little toward the Berlin build-up during the Fall of 1961, the British cannot be expected to improve their position under conditions of the above assumption. In fact, there will most certainly be a slight reduction in the number of personnel in the BAOR over the next year even though the actual number of units is not reduced.

e. Netherlands: The Dutch responded to Berlin crisis by extending the conscription period 2 months, increasing the manning levels of NATO units and temporarily moving one light brigade to Germany. No change in the "crisis" atmosphere would probably result in a Dutch return to original

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status, especially if Germany and U.S. do not maintain their build-up of forces.

f. Belgium: M-Day divisions in Germany have been augmented but are still short by 3,000 enlisted personnel. Both Army and Air Forces are short of technicians. Softening of the Berlin crisis and extensive negotiations would not tend to cause Belgium to ease back to previous manning levels to any great extent, since the Belgian build-up was not primarily in response to the Berlin crisis. A different situation would obtain.

g. Italy: Italy took some significant short term actions such as accelerated training and equipment procurement, but the effects are not expected to be long term. Denmark: A reduction in level of the "crisis" would probably accelerate plans to reduce the current 16 month conscription period and allow manning levels to become even lower. Internal pressures for increased defense spending would probably suffer.

i. Norway: Although M-Day units had slight improvements in manning levels, no significant build-up was achieved. A leveling off of the "crisis" would probably result in gradual decline of manning levels and defense spending.

j. Greece: The strength of the Army was increased from 115,000 to 128,000; the manning levels of M-Day units were thereby raised to 76%. Training of non-organic support units has been intensified. The Greek military effort is almost entirely dependent upon external support.

k. Turkey: The manning level of M-Day divisions was raised to 91% (except for officers and NCO's) and 1st Ezelion divisions from 45% to 81%. Shortages of regular personnel and skilled technicians remain an important weakness. Efforts to improve the Turkish military posture will require increased U.S. MAP support and grant aid.

l. Portugal and Luxembourg: The Berlin crisis has had no impact on these countries.

m. Summary: It is concluded that the units made available to SACEUR as a result of the Berlin crisis will be maintained. Except for Germany and France there may be a slight reduction in the manning over the period under the assumed conditions. Thus, to a total of 21 2/3 divisions (including U.S. and Canada) assigned to Central European Forces on 1 July 1961 there has already been added one German and two French divisions for a total of 24 1/3 divisions. This total could be increased to 30 divisions by the end of the year if France and Germany each add three more divisions.

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question: On the basis of paragraph 2 above, how would NATO one year from now stand with respect to the Soviet Bloc, i.e., better off, worse off, or the same?

DATE:

- a. Within the framework of the current NATO strategic concept (i.e., no concept of limited war with the Soviets; use nuclear weapons at the outset except for local hostile actions, infiltrations and incursions) NATO will remain the same versus the Soviet Bloc in that the current nuclear superiority of the West will remain a deterrent on major Soviet moves.
- b. Within the framework of the strategic concept envisioned by the 21 April 1961 U.S. Policy Directive on NATO (i.e., halt Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked) there would be only a very slight achievement. NATO capability to carry out such a concept. Given the imbalance of non-nuclear forces which will exist a year from now, it is considered that the Soviets could rapidly effect a major penetration of the main NATO defenses and thus place NATO non-nuclear forces in a situation where they could no longer cope with the Soviet non-nuclear attack. The questions that must then be explored are: What would be the effect on Soviet forces deep in Germany of nuclear strikes on the USSR? Would the Soviets, despite mutual use of nuclear weapons, overrun Western Europe? If the answer to the latter question is negative, then the situation of NATO versus the Soviet Bloc one year from now will have worsened.
- c. Within the framework of the mutual nuclear deterrent which will exist in 1966, a NATO increase to 30 divisions by the end of this year can be considered as insignificant. In order to escape the dilemma of 1966, NATO should achieve prior to that time a capability to meet any Soviet non-nuclear aggression with non-nuclear means. In this sense, time is running out and the situation of NATO versus the Soviet Bloc one year from now will have greatly worsened.

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